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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/£ pellee,
v.
RONNIE C. BYRD

Case No. 950399-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE'S WAIVER ARGUMENT IMPLICATES SEPARATE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES THAT COMPEL THE
DETERMINATION THAT BYRD INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT,
AND THE PROSECUTORS QUESTIONS AT TRIAL CONCERNING THAT
SILENCE WERE IMPROPER AND HARMFUL,
The state contends that by introducing Byrd's post-arrest
silence into evidence during trial, the state did not violate
Byrd's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory selfincrimination as set forth in Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976)t1 for the following reasons: "1) [Byrd] waived his right
to remain silent; . . . and 2) any violation was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."

(Brief of Appellee ("S.B.") at 7.)

In connection with its "waiver" argument, the state alleges

1

Byrd asserted in his opening brief that the state violated his
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the federal
constitution and art. I, § 12 of the state constitution by improperly
introducing into evidence Byrd's post-arrest silence. Byrd provided an
analysis under the federal constitution and relied on Dovle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 617 (1976) . Byrd noted in his opening brief that he was not
urging a separate analysis of the issue under the Utah Constitution.
(Brief of Appellant at 9 n.l.)
However, since the state has argued that the prosecutor was at
liberty to make reference to Byrd's post-arrest silence because Byrd
"waived" the right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona 3 84 U.S. 43 6
(1966) , Byrd asserts the Utah Constitution analysis is separate from the
federal analysis for the "waiver" issue, as set forth herein.
1

that the officer's post-arrest discussions with Byrd were as
follows: the officer advised Byrd of his rights per Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Byrd "said he understood his rights
and wanted to talk" to the officer; the officer made an alleged
"declaratory" statement that he had a video-tape of a drug
transaction involving Byrd; Byrd was silent.

"The next time" the

officer initiated discussions with Byrd, Byrd allegedly confessed
that "he just wanted to get high, and that he purchased the
drugs." (S.B. at 7.) According to the state, Byrd waived his
right to be silent, thereby permitting the state to introduce
into evidence testimony concerning Byrd's silence in the face of
the alleged "declaratory" statement.2
Contrary to the state's recitation of the facts, the officer
did not make a simple "declaratory" statement about the videotaped transaction.
response.

The officer made an inquiry that demanded

a

He testified that when he inquired about the video-

As set forth in Byrd's opening brief, the arresting officer
testified on direct examination that in response to inquiries concerning
the video-taped transaction, Byrd "declined" to comment. (R. 483-85;
529-32.) In addition, during Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor
again raised the issue of Byrd's silence in the wake of the Miranda
warnings. (R. 600-01.) The prosecutor asked Byrd the following:
(Prosecutor) Q: Do you remember the officer testifying that when he
gave you the Miranda warnings you said, "Yes I'll talk to you"?
(Byrd) A: I remember him saying that.
Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda warnings?
A: I can't remember if he did or not.
Q: So it could have been or it could not have been; that's what you
are saying?
A: I just know[,] I didn't talk to him.
Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about the driver
buying these drugs, did you?
A: I didn't say anything about no drugs, period.
Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these guys, did you?
(R. 600-01; 659-660.)
2

taped transaction, Byrd "declined to answer

me." (R. 722.) The

officer expected Byrd to answer, but he remained silent until a
considerable amount of time passed and he and the officer were at
the jail doors.
exercised silence

Pursuant to his right to remain silent, Byrd
in response to officer inquiries regarding the

video tape.
As set forth below, since Byrd exercised his right to remain
silent, the prosecutor's references to post-arrest silence
violated Byrd's rights under the federal constitution and Utah's
art. I, § § 7 and 12.
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more
weight to the defendant's previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the reasons
for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative
inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that
the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest.
U.S. v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
Stated another way, emphasis on a defendant's silence in the
wake of an arrest highlights the discrepancy between that silence
and defendant's detailed testimony at trial, and between that
silence and the willingness of other potential suspects to
explain their innocence to the arresting officers (in this case,
the potential suspects were the other occupants of the car).
Such discrepancies instill the inference in the jury that a
defendant has fabricated his trial testimony.

Thus, use of a

defendant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings
is impermissible. See Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) .
In denying Byrd's motion for a new trial, the trial court
did not find that Byrd "waived" his rights per Miranda as
3

suggested by the state.

Rather, the trial court ruled that "the

trial errors, if any, noted in defendant's motion for a new trial
were harmless." (R. 207.) Even though the trial court did not
base its ruling on a "waiver" analysis, the state has asked this
Court to affirm the trial court's decision on that basis. (S.B.
at 8 n.l.) In response thereto, Byrd urges this Court to find
that there was no "knowing" and "voluntary" waiver. State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1273 (Utah 1993). In the alternative,
this Court should find that under state and federal
constitutional analyses, Byrd's silence in the wake of postMiranda officer inquiries constituted reinvocation of his right
to remain silent.
Although the state does not address the "waiver" issue under
the state constitution, Byrd asserts that the federal and state
constitutional analyses are separate, as set forth supra Points
I.B. and C. If this Court fails to find that Byrd sufficiently
reinvoked his right to remain silent under the federal analysis,
Byrd respectfully requests that the Court reach a different
conclusion under the state analysis.

Once this Court has

determined Byrd did not waive his constitutional right to remain
silent, it must necessarily conclude that the prosecutor's
references at trial to Byrd's post-arrest silence violated his
rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the federal
constitution and Utah's art. I, §§ 7 and 12.
A.

THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH WAIVER.

Case law is clear that statements made by a defendant in
4

response to custodial interrogation "are not admissible as
evidence unless the defendant is told of his Miranda rights, and
the defendant 'knowingly and intelligently waive[s] these rights
and agrees to answer questions. '"

State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 894,

897 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479), cert,
granted, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). Likewise, the defendant's
silence is not admissible.

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.

Courts employ every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The state has a "heavy burden" when proving a defendant waived
Miranda rights. See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah
App. 1990) (citing State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah
1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1977)). Where a defendant
invokes his right to silence "in any manner," that right must be
"scrupulously honored." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
Although two officers were at the scene when Byrd was
arrested, only one officer testified that Byrd "waived" his
rights per Miranda.

That testimony reflects the following:

I advised [defendant] of his rights. I went through the four
steps that are necessary, asked him if he would talk to me.
He agreed, which was a waiver of his rights. And then
proceeded to talk to the defendant.
(R. 483, 709.)

The officer's statements are uncorroborated. In

addition, they are in direct conflict with Byrd's testimony that
he did not waive his rights per Miranda.

(R. 600, 762.)

The state failed to establish a clear and knowing waiver.
The requirement that a defendant be advised of Miranda rights and
knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in order to admit a
statement made during custodial interrogation remains intact.
5

[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.
n
[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and
request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." A
suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to
counsel after having that right explained to him has
indicated his willingness to deal with police unassisted.
Davis v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).

The state's "waiver" evidence does not

establish a knowing and voluntary waiver.

Thus the state should

have been precluded at trial from referring to Byrd's silence in
the wake of Miranda warnings.

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.

In the event this Court disagrees and determines the state
has established an initial "waiver," Byrd's subsequent expression
compels the determination that he reinvoked his right to remain
silent, as set forth below.
B. UNDER A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, "REINVOCATION"
OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT REQUIRES OFFICERS TO
DISCONTINUE QUESTIONING, AND LOGICALLY PRECLUDES THE
PROSECUTOR FROM REFERRING TO SUCH QUESTIONING DURING TRIAL.
In support of the "waiver" argument, the state relies only
on a federal constitutional analysis as set forth in Davis v.
U.S., 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994).

The state asserts Byrd did not

"[re]invoke the right 'sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney.'"

(S.B. at 13

(quoting Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355).)
In Davis, prior to police interrogation the defendant waived
his right to counsel both orally and in writing. Id. at 2353.
When he later expressed an equivocal intent to reinvoke his right
6

to an attorney, the officer reminded the defendant of his rights
per Miranda and clarified whether defendant was requesting
counsel.

Id.

The defendant responded that he was not.

the officer continued the interview.

Thus,

When the defendant again

equivocally invoked his right to counsel, the questioning ceased.
Id.

The Davis Court ruled that after a defendant has made a

knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, law
enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless
the defendant clearly reinvokes that right. The Court elaborated:
"Invocation of the Miranda

right to counsel 'requires, at a

minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.'"
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (cites omitted).
At least one court has held that Davis is not applicable
where the defendant invokes his right to silence rather than
counsel.

See State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592-93 (Ariz.

App. Div. 1 1995).

The rationale for the Strayhand holding was

that Davis did not expressly discuss an equivocal assertion of
the right to silence, and existing state case law requiring
clarification of an equivocal assertion of the right to silence
remains in effect until the United States Supreme Court rules
otherwise. As further set forth infra. Point I.C., Utah appellate
decisions, which have directly addressed the issue of whether
officers can proceed with questioning when defendant equivocally
invokes Miranda rights, have consistently held that officers are
limited to asking clarifying questions. See State v. Griffin, 754
7

P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100,
1109 (Utah App. 1990); and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 902
(Utah App. 1993).

Gutierrez involved the equivocal invocation of

the right to silence and was not overruled by Davis.
In the event this Court nevertheless determines Davis
governs this case and requires a clear reinvocation of the right
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, Byrd's expression
could not have been clearer: silence in the face of officer
interrogation. It was a reinvocation of the right to remain
silent. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 610. Consider what happened next in
Byrd's case: after Byrd "declined to answer" the officer's
inquiries, the officer discontinued discussions for approximately
2 0 minutes until he was pulling into the jail with Byrd, at which
time the officer began interrogations again and Byrd allegedly
confessed to buying the drugs.3

The officer must have recognized

Byrd's earlier silence in the face of interrogation to be an
invocation of the right to remain silent.
In further support of the "waiver" argument under Davis, the
state relied on this Court's ruling in Leyva, 906 P.2d at 896.
There, officers pulled defendant over after a high-speed chase,
removed defendant from the car, and immediately handcuffed him.
Thirty minutes after the arrest, the officer read defendant his

3

Because of the passage of approximately 20 minutes (R. 443, 510,
515, 571, 572-73), during which time Byrd remained silent, and Byrd's
reinvocation of the right to remain silent, the arresting officer at
least should have provided Byrd with fresh Miranda warnings before asking
him, "What's up, what's going on?" when he was pulling into the jail with
Byrd. (R. 489-90); Michigan v. Moselv, 423 U.S. 96, 104-06 (1975).
8

rights per Miranda, and asked defendant if he understood them.
Leyva, 906 P.2d at 896.

When the defendant responded "yes," the

officer asked defendant if he wished to talk.

Defendant first

answered "I don't know," prompting the officer to inform him that
he did not have to answer questions and that it was up to
defendant. Defendant nodded his head.
questions, which defendant answered.

The officer then asked
Id.

The state in L e w a asserted an "'unhesitating and
incriminating' response demonstrate[d] a valid waiver."
899.

Id. at

Here, the state should recognize that unmistakable silence

and a refusal to respond in the face of interrogation is an invocation of the right to remain silent. This is a logical way to
exercise the right to remain silent.

Once a defendant indicates

in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Leyva, 906 P.2d at 897 (quoting, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
The state also relies on State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). That case is
distinguishable where the state argued "there [was] no sign that
Harrison ever invoked his right to silence" and Harrison did not
assert on appeal that he ever invoked such a right.
787-88.

805 P.2d at

The Harrison case brings us back to the prosecutor's

misconduct in eliciting testimony concerning a defendant's
silence.

The prosecutor in Harrison did not reference post-

Miranda statements or silence, but placed Harrison's trial
9

testimony into question by suggesting during closing argument
that Harrison fabricated his story. In that context, "the
statement did not 'naturally and necessarily' invite the jury to
consider anything Harrison may or may not have said" immediately
following his arrest.

Id. at 788.

However, in this case, there could be no mistake that the
prosecutor was eliciting testimony concerning post-arrest
silence.

He elicited testimony that Byrd said "nothing" in the

face of officer interrogations immediately following arrest.
Since Byrd's silence reflected an unequivocal reinvocation of his
rights per Miranda, the prosecutor was prohibited from referring
to Byrd's post-arrest silence. The prosecutor should have been
precluded during trial from referencing Byrd's post-arrest and
post-Miranda silence.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) .

C. SINCE ARTICLE I, S 12 REQUIRES AN OFFICER TO LIMIT DISCUSSIONS TO CLARIFYING QUESTIONS WHEN AN IN-CUSTODY SUSPECT
EQUIVOCALLY INVOKES HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE, IT WAS IMPROPER
FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF BYRD'S SILENCE.
In the event this Court determines Byrd's silence does not
constitute a reinvocation of his rights per Miranda under Davis,
supra Point I.B., the Utah Constitution compels a different
result. Byrd's right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination under the Utah Constitution requires an officer to
clarify an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent;
failure to clarify requires that any statements made during
continued interrogation be suppressed.

Article I, § 12 of the

Utah Constitution requires (1) that officers give Miranda-like
warnings to in-custody suspects, and (2) that where a suspect
10

makes an ambiguous reference to his right to silence, an officer
who is not reasonably certain whether the suspect is invoking
that right is limited to asking clarifying questions.
In this matter, Byrd exercised his right to remain silent by
remaining silent in the face of police inquiries. Under the Utah
Constitution, to the extent Byrd's conduct was ambiguous, the
officer was required to limit additional discussions to
clarifying questions.

Since the officer failed to do so, the

prosecutor was prohibited from making reference to Byrd's silence
during trial.
1. ARTICLE I, § 12 REQUIRES OFFICERS TO GIVE MIRANDA-LIKE
WARNINGS TO AN IN-CUSTODY SUSPECT.
The analysis under art. I, § 12 begins with determining
whether the officer is required under the Utah Constitution to
give Miranda-like warnings. Art. I, § 12 provides in part that
11

[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against

himself."

Although the Utah Supreme Court indicated in State v.

Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996), that it has never
held that "Miranda-type warnings are required under the Utah
constitution" (see also Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting)), Byrd
asserts Utah's art. I, § 12 requires such warnings.
The Miranda decision and the analysis and rationale employed
by the United States Supreme Court in reaching its decision in
that case provide guidance to this Court in determining whether
Miranda-like warnings are required for custodial interrogations
pursuant to art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
11

The Miranda

court focused on the "historical development of the privilege"
against self-incrimination, "the sound policies which have
nurtured its evolution," and judicial precedent in determining
that procedural safeguards are necessary in order to effectuate
the privilege. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459, 462-63.
a.

The historical development.

The federal rights embodied in the Fifth Amendment are
"precious rights [which] were fixed in our [federal] Constitution
only after centuries of persecution and struggle." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 442.

The Miranda warnings were fashioned to preserve

such rights which could be "put in jeopardy [] through official
overbearing."

Id. The warnings ensure that the protection

against self-incrimination as envisioned by our country's founders remains viable and does not become a "form of words."

Id.

In implementing the warnings, the United States Supreme
Court considered Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896), a
decision issued in 1896, the year Utah's constitution was
adopted.

Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 443.

The Brown Court recognized

that the privilege against self-incrimination "'had its origin in
a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods
of interrogating accused persons.'"

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442

(quoting Brown, 161 U.S. at 596-97).
Article I, § 12 has similar origins.

In American Fork City

v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), this Court traced the
history of the Utah constitutional protection and determined that
at the time the Utah provision was adopted, the "prevailing view"
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was that differences in wording between the Utah provision and
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination were
not significant.

Id. at 1072.

This Court considered the Utah

Constitutional Convention Proceedings and concluded:
Thus, if any intent can be derived from the proceedings of
Utah's Constitutional Convention, it is that the framers
intended the privilege to have the same scope that it had
under similar constitutional provisions, which was the scope
it had at common law.
•

*

*

It is widely acknowledged that the common law privilege
against self-incrimination was aimed directly at the
inquisitorial system of the English ecclesiastical courts,
traces of which began to creep into the civil law system at
an early date.
Id. at 1073 (cites omitted); see also Larson, 733 P.2d at 138.
Utah's unique history at the time the state constitution was
adopted also supports the giving of Miranda-like warnings.

The

inquisitorial procedure condemned in Coscrrove and Miranda was
used or feared during the federal raids against polygamist
families during the time period immediately preceding statehood.
Families were jailed if they refused to "cooperate" with federal
marshals.

Bradley, Hide and Seek:

Children on the Underground,

51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 142 (1983); ex parte Harris, 5 P. 129 (Utah
1884).

The drafters of the state constitution were no doubt

sensitive to the importance of this protection.
Utah law reflects that Utah's constitutional provision
shares a history with the Fifth Amendment. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d at
1073; Larson, 733 P.2d at 138.

The discussion in Miranda of the

historical development of the Fifth Amendment provision, which
supports implementation of the warnings, is applicable to the
13

art. I, § 12 provision.
b.

Sound policies which have nurtured its evolution.

The sound policies which have nurtured the evolution of the
right against self-incrimination also supported the
implementation of warnings in Miranda.

The requirement that

officers give "Miranda warnings" was imposed as a procedural
safeguard aimed at "secur[ing] the privilege against selfincrimination."

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The warnings were

structured as a means "to inform accused persons of their right
to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise
it."

Id.

The court recognized the inherently compulsive

atmosphere of custodial interrogation and that the "practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's
most cherished principles--that the individual not be compelled
to incriminate himself."

Id. at 457-58.

The Miranda warnings

were formulated "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings."

Id.

The privilege itself as well as the Miranda

requirement are based in part on "the respect a government--state
or federal--must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."

Id. at 460.

The same policies have nurtured art. I,

§ 12, see Coscrrove, 701 P. 2d at 1073, supporting implementation
of Miranda-like warnings to preserve art. I, § 12 protections.
c.

Judicial precedent.

In fashioning the Miranda warnings, the United States
Supreme Court considered judicial precedent which "clearly
establishe[d]" the "application of the privilege to incommunicado
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interrogation."

Id. at 457-58.

It determined that precedent,

including, inter alia, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
supported and required the imposition of procedural safeguards.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
Utah precedent supports a requirement that Miranda-type
warnings be given in order to preserve the Utah constitutional
protection.

In In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650

(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that procedural
protections patterned after the Miranda warnings are required in
interrogations made pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act

("the

Act") if the art. I, § 12 privilege against giving compelled
evidence "is to be meaningfully available."

Id. at 648.

The court reasoned that in interrogations under the Act,
"the psychological compulsion may be more analogous to that
present in a police custodial inquiry, rather than one before the
grand jury."

Id.

"Because the privilege is intended to protect

against confessions secured by the sheer force of psychological
intimidation," the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment and
art. I, § 12 mandate procedural protections along the lines of
those required by Miranda.

Id.

The court used the Miranda

warnings as a "general guide," id., in outlining the following
warnings to be given in this context.

First, the witness must be

informed "of the general subject matter of the investigation."
Id. at 649.

Second, the witness must be informed that s/he "may

refuse to answer any question or produce any evidence of a
communicative nature that may result in self-incrimination."
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Id.

Third, the witness must be informed "that any information
provided may be used against the individual in court."

Id.

Fourth, the witness must be informed that s/he "may have counsel
present."

Id.

Finally, the witness must be informed that s/he

is a "target" of the investigation and, if that is the case, "the
nature of the charges under consideration against them."

Id.

The first warning is not required under Miranda because an
individual in a police custody setting "almost certainly will
know the nature of the crime being investigated," whereas an
individual subpoenaed under the Subpoena Powers Act will have no
such knowledge.

Id. The fifth requirement is based only on the

Utah Constitution.

Id. at 650.

The Utah Supreme Court

recognized that in an earlier decision, the United States Supreme
Court refused to adopt a warning under the Fifth Amendment
applicable to "target" witnesses.

Id. at 649-50 (considering

U.S. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)). "[T] he entire tone of
Washington constrains us from finding that the federal
constitution requires routine target warnings in the context of
all Subpoena Powers Act interrogations."

Id. at 650.

Although the state and federal rights against selfincrimination share common law roots, they are subject to
differing interpretations under certain circumstances.

In that

regard, the Utah court considered "whether, as a matter of state
law, we will require target warnings" under art. I, § 12 of the
Utah Constitution.

Id. at 650.

Fully ten years before Washington, this Court ruled in State
v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 225, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (1967),
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that article I, section 12 requires that state grand jury
witnesses be notified of their target status and of the
charges being considered against them. At this time, we see
no reason to reexamine our holding in Rugaeri, and we think
that Subpoena Powers Act targets are similarly situated with
respect to their privilege against self-incrimination as are
state grand jury targets. Therefore, we hold that the
target warnings required by Ruggeri must be given to
Subpoena Powers Act targets, and we read such a requirement
into the Act. Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Id.

Although the Ruggeri court only nominally mentioned art. I,

§ 12, its reference was sufficient to reaffirm the Ruggeri
holding under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 650.
In re Investigation supports that the Utah Constitution requires certain Miranda-based warnings to preserve constitutional
rights where an individual is subpoenaed under the Act.

The same

rationale that applies for requiring warnings in that context
applies when an individual is subjected to custodial questioning
by the police.

In fact, given the coercive nature of such

interrogations, warnings are more necessary in the custodial
interrogation context than they are for a witness subpoenaed
under the Act.
Additionally, it was apparently the pre-Miranda practice in
Utah to inform defendants subjected to custodial interrogation of
their rights. See State v. Belgard, 479 P.2d 344, 344 (Utah 1971)
(prior to Miranda decision, defendant "was warned of his rights,
except that he was entitled to appointed counsel without
charge"); State v. Gardner, 230 P.2d 559 (Utah 1951) (no evidence
that confession was made as the result of "coercion, pressure or
mistreatment" where statement was made "after repeated
consultation with his lawyers and after he had twice been fully
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informed of his rights on previous occasions").
Various courts from other states have required Miranda-like
warnings under their state constitutions.

See, e.g., Traylor v.

State, 596 So.2d 957, 961 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (listing state courts
which have "construed the self-incrimination provisions of their
state constitutions independently of the federal court's Fifth
Amendment holding"); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Ha.
1971); State v. Johnson, 669 A.2d 222 (N.H. 1995); State v.
Jones, 534 A.2d 1199, 1202 n.3 (Conn. 1987); Comm. v. Smith, 593
N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992); State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1310 n.6
(Conn. 1987) (recognizing Miranda warnings have "independent
significance" under state constitution).

The rationale in these

cases is equally applicable to the Utah provision.

See, e.g. ,

Santiago, 492 P.2d at 664-65 (employing rationale for Miranda
decision; rule preserves integrity of the judicial process).
The historical development of the art. I, § 12 privilege
including the history it shares with the Fifth Amendment
provision as well as Utah's unique history, "the sound policies
which have nurtured its evolution," and judicial precedent all
demonstrate that procedural safeguards are necessary to preserve
the art. I, § 12 privilege.

Accordingly, the state

constitutional privilege requires officers to provide Mirandalike warnings to suspects who are subjected to custodial
interrogation in order to preserve the privilege and ensure that
it does not become a mere "form of words."
2. ARTICLE I, § 12 REQUIRES THAT WHERE AN IN-CUSTODY SUSPECT MAKES AN EQUIVOCAL ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE,
FURTHER QUESTIONING IS LIMITED TO CLARIFYING THE ASSERTION.
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Regardless of whether the Utah Constitution requires that a
suspect be given Miranda-like warnings, the Utah Constitution
nevertheless requires that officers be limited to asking clarifying questions where a suspect equivocally invokes his right to
silence. Although the art. I, § 12 right against self-incrimination evolved from the same common law roots as the 5th Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the scope of the state
constitutional privilege may be broader in certain circumstances
than its federal counterpart. See In re Investigation, 754 P.2d
at 646-47; Ruggeri, 429 P.2d at 973; Cosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1073
("the scope of the constitutional guarantees is not limited by
their historical roots").

As discussed supra Point I.C.I., the

Utah Supreme Court has held that the Utah privilege is broader
than the Fifth Amendment privilege in that it requires officials
to inform an individual that he is a "target" of a grand jury
investigation as well as the nature of the charges for which he
is under investigation. In re Investigations, 754 P.2d at 649-50.
Perhaps the most compelling indication that the Utah
protection is stronger than the federal is the analysis employed
in the equivocal-invocation context by the court in State v.
Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993) (disavowed on other grounds,
Mirguet, 914 P.2d at 1147 n.2), and by this Court in Griffin, 754
P.2d at 969, Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1109, and Gutierrez, 864 P.2d
at 902.

When analyzing equivocal invocations of Miranda rights,

Utah courts consistently have held that officers are limited to
asking clarifying questions.
The rationale for employing this middle ground test is that
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it provides "a practical and sensible solution."

The

clarification approach allows a suspect to answer further
questions if s/he is so inclined while also protecting the
suspect's right to counsel and silence.

Wood, 868 P.2d at 84.

It provides a clear, bright line rule for officers:

When they

are not reasonably certain whether a suspect is invoking his
rights, they must focus on clarifying that issue.

This approach

ensures that the concerns about compelled testimony discussed in
Miranda and its progeny are met.

See Id.

Just as the Utah Supreme Court found no reason to overrule
its decision in Ruggeri after the United States Supreme Court
departed from that view, there is no reason to depart from Wood
and this Court's decisions in Griffin, Sampson, and Gutierrez.
When analyzing equivocal invocations of Miranda rights, the
officer must be limited in his inquiries to clarifying the
invocation of the right to remain silent. Wood and the decisions
of this Court are well-reasoned and offer the most sensible
approach for officers who are faced with that circumstance.
Indeed, the clarification approach was embraced by the majority
of courts confronted with the issue prior to Davis.

See Wood,

868 P.2d at 84; L e w a , 906 P.2d at 897-98; Davis, 114 S.Ct. at
2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring).4

4

Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected
the clarification approach in the post-waiver context, four of the
justices agree with the majority of other courts which have considered
the issue that clarification is required to preserve the privilege. See
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in result, joined by
Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J.).
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As this Court, Justice Souter (note 4, supra) and various
other courts recognized, criminal defendants often lack
linguistic and educational skills and are intimidated by the
coercive nature of custodial interrogations.
L e w a , 906 P. 2d at 897.

See note 4, supra;

Under such circumstances, attempts by

individuals to assert or reassert their rights are often muddled
or ambiguous. Thus clarifying such ambiguities provides officers
with a bright line approach.

Any other result would allow the

state to structure an argument that defendant's assertion was
equivocal, leaving officers free to trample over precious rights.
The only fair, reasonable approach is to require officers to
clarify an ambiguous reference to Miranda or art. I, § 12 rights.
Id. If the art. I, § 12 protection is to remain available in a
meaningful way, this Court should reaffirm Wood, Gutierrez,
Sampson, and Griffin as being required by the Utah Constitution.
Other courts have rejected the holding in Davis under their
state constitutions.

See State v. Hoev. 881 P.2d 504, 524 (Ha.

1994) (state failed to establish defendant waived right to
counsel under state constitution where officers did not clarify
equivocal request); Deck v. State, 653 So.2d 434, 437 (Fla. App.
5 Dist. 1995) (Florida constitution requires clarification of
equivocal assertion of right to silence); see also Strayhand, 911
P.2d at 592-93, reaffirming State v. Finehout, 665 P.2d 570, 573
(Ariz. 1983), which requires clarification of equivocal
references to right to silence despite Davis decision.
Additionally, the majority of pre-Davis decisions require
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clarification of equivocal references to the right to counsel or
silence.

See, e.g., Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 856 (Miss.

1991) ("This Court has joined the trend by permitting an
interrogator to clarify ambiguous utterances"); State v.
Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn. 1988); State v. Moulds, 673
P.2d 1074, 1082 (Idaho App. 1983).
In this matter, Byrd's silence was an unequivocal reinvocation of the right to remain silent.

Under the Utah Constitution,

to the extent the exercise of Byrd's silence was ambiguous, the
officer was limited to asking clarifying questions.

Because the

officer failed in that task, (R. 722-23), the officer was
prohibited from having further discussions with Byrd.

Further,

it was improper for the prosecutor to present evidence of Byrd's
silence in the wake of post-Miranda police inquiries.

Byrd's

convictions should be reversed.
D. THE VIOLATION OF BYRD'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT RESULTED IN
PREJUDICIAL HARM.
The state asserts, in any event, that any error in
permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning Byrd's
silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings was "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." (S.B. at 15.)

In support of that assertion,

the state focuses on evidence supporting Byrd's guilt, "[m]ost
significantly, defendant['s] admi[ssion] to Detective Thurgood
that he purchased the drugs because he wanted to get high.
490.)"

(S.B. at 16.)

(R.

Yet if the trial court had ruled, as it

should have, that Byrd's post-Miranda silence constituted an
invocation of his right to remain silent precluding reference to
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the silence, by nature of that ruling, the later "confession"
evidence necessarily would have been inadmissible for want of
valid Miranda warnings.

In that instance, because Byrd exercised

his right to remain silent, the officer's failure to at least
reMirandize Byrd before asking "what's up?" invalidated the
alleged confession. See note 3, supra.
The reference to Byrd's silence and the alleged confession
are directly linked. Once Byrd expressed his desire to remain
silent, the officer's subsequent discussions with Byrd without
giving him fresh Miranda warnings violated the state and federal
constitutions.

The trial court's error in failing to grant a new

trial as a result of the improper testimony, and/or in failing to
admonish the jury to disregard such evidence had a direct and
prejudicial impact on the confession evidence.5

The additional

"circumstantial evidence of [Byrd's] guilt" as identified by the
state (S.B. at 16-18) is slight. Thus, the error was prejudicial
as set forth herein and as further set forth in Byrd's opening
brief (Brief of Appellant, dated September 6, 1996).
5

The state suggests Byrd should have requested that the trial court
specifically admonish the jury to disregard the testimony concerning
Byrd's silence or request a curative instruction (S.B. at 19), and that
his failure to do so has precluded him from raising the issue on appeal.
The state seeks to elevate "preservation" requirements beyond what is
necessary. Byrd did all that was required of him by timely objecting to
the testimony and stating the basis for the objection. Once Byrd made
his objections, the trial court was required to render a ruling, and in
this case, take appropriate, curative measures.
This matter was in an unusual posture where the trial court refused
to rule on the timely trial objection until months after the trial. The
jury had long since been dismissed. If the trial court had been more
timely in its ruling, a curative instruction would have been appropriate.
If the trial court had timely admonished the jury, the parties would have
been on notice that the confession evidence was poisoned where the
officer failed to reMirandize Byrd.
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POINT II. BYRD'S COMPLAINT WITH REGARD TO THE STATE # S
FAILURE TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY FOCUSES ON HIS CREDIBILITY
TO THE JURY, NOT THE VALIDITY OF HIS DEFENSE.
In response to Byrd's complaint that the state admittedly
failed to supplement its discovery with facts bearing directly on
the officers' search of the car, the state asserts that if
counsel for Byrd had known about the changed testimony, "counsel
could have developed a theory[/theme] consistent with the
evidence." (S.B. 20 and 22.) Byrd does not contend he was unable
to "develop" a defense "theme" or "theory consistent with the
evidence." Byrd's contention is that the state's failure to disclose the critical information created
of

the

jurors

an impression

in

the

minds

that Byrd's defense was fabricated; and that the

new testimony unraveled the "fabric" leaving Byrd to pick up the
threads and put it back together.

In that sense, Byrd's

credibility with the jury was irreparably compromised.
If Byrd's counsel had been apprised of the change in
testimony, even just prior to opening arguments, counsel could
have proceeded with Byrd's case, still consistent with the
evidence, but lacking the critical appearance of "salvaging" the
case.

Surely such an appearance left the jury wondering.
Contrary to the state's assertions, Byrd's counsel was not

able to turn the situation around. In opening arguments, counsel
relied on the officer's previous version of the facts, and directed the jury to pay special and close attention to those facts as
they came into evidence.

However, because the testimony changed,

the facts did not come into evidence as promised. Thus the jury's
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attention was focused on the absolute conflict between the facts
and the representations made by counsel in opening argument.
The state admits it failed to supplement discovery. It
claims, however, that Byrd was not prejudiced by the state's admitted failure. Contrary to that assertion, the prejudice caused
by the surprise testimony was sufficient to require reversal.
In addition, under the cumulative error doctrine, see State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993), reversal is appropriate
if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had. Under that doctrine, reversal
here is appropriate and necessary. As set forth above, the
testimony referencing Byrd's silence violated his right against
self incrimination, caused the jury to focus on the fact that he
did not explain his innocence when he was arrested, and related
to later testimony concerning an alleged confession.

Compound

that with out-dated discovery that compromised the credibility of
Byrd's case in the eyes of the jury. Absent these errors, the
state's evidence was not particularly strong.
CONCLUSION
There is a reasonable probability that on retrial, the jury
will render a verdict more favorable to Byrd. State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).

Byrd's convictions for two counts

of unlawful possession of a controlled substance should be
vacated and remanded for a new trial.
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